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ADMISSIBILITY OF AN UNAVAILABLE WITNESS'
GRAND JURY TESTIMONY: UPHOLDING THE
PURPOSES BEHIND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."' Read literally, the confrontation clause imposes an ab-
solute bar against the presentation of testimony by an out-of-court
witness against criminal defendants.2 The Supreme Court, however,
has never interpreted the clause in this manner.' The Court recognizes
the admissibility of certain extra-judicial statements that fall under
recognized exceptions to the hearsay4 rule.5 Deciding which hearsay
exceptions qualify for admission under the confrontation clause has
proven to be a particularly troublesome issue for the Court.6
Recent Supreme Court decisions have generated considerable con-
fusion concerning the relationship between the evidentiary limitations
imposed by the hearsay rule and its exceptions, and the constitutional
limitations imposed by the confrontation clause.7 These decisions
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Comment, Constitutional Law-Confrontation Clause-Admission at Trial
of Slain Informant's Prior Grand Jury Testimony Against Defendants Does Not Violate
Confrontation Guarantee Despite Lack of Cross-Examination, 31 VAND. L. REV. 682, 685
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Admission at Trial of Slain Informant's Prior
Grand Jury Testimony]. See also Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward,
A Peek Forward, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 32 (1973).
3. Comment, Admission at Trial of Slain Informant's Prior Grand Jury
Testimony, supra note 2, at 685.
4. Hearsay is an out-of-court declaration offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 1361 (3d ed. 1940). Because hearsay is not cross-
examined, courts find the declarations too unreliable to be admitted into evidence.
Id. S 1362. Where some substitute for cross-examination provides alternative assurances
of reliability, the hearsay rule does not bar the admission of out-of-court declarations.
Id. S 1420.
5. The Supreme Court has always recognized the admissibility of dying
declarations. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892). In certain instances,
the Court also recognizes the admissibility of a witness' former trial testimony. Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895).
6. Natali, Green, Dutton, and Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory,
7 RUT..CAM. L.J. 43, 43-47 (1975); Younger, supra note 2, at 32.
7. See generally Baker, The Right to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules, and
Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials,
6 CONN. L. REV. 529, 530-32 (Spring, 1974); Natali, supra note 6, at 43.
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demonstrate the Court's inability to develop a coherent theory of the
relationship between confrontation and hearsay.' As a result, substan-
tial disunity exists among the United States Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals regarding the proper approach and resolution of the
confrontation-hearsay query. Of particular interest is the discrepancy
among the circuits concerning the admissibility of an unavailable9 witness'
grand jury testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5),1"
8. Weston, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1214 (1979);
Younger, supra note 2, at 41; Note, Constitutional Law-Right of Confrontation, 59 U.
DET. J. URB. L. 127, 145 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right of Confrontation].
9. The term "unavailable" as used herein refers to witnesses who are
unavailable to testify in person at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a).
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) states:
Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes
situations in which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground
of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of
his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject
matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do
so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter
of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing
because of death or then existing physical or mental illness
or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his
statement has been unable to procure his attendance (or in
the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3),
or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other
reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrong-
doing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing
the witness from attending or testifying.
10. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) will hereinafter be referred to as Fed.
R. Evid. 804(b)(5). Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5) provides:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 4
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one of the so-called catch-all hearsay exceptions. 1
The federal circuit courts of appeals are experiencing considerable
difficulty in deciding the admissibility of an unavailable witness' grand
jury testimony. Because grand jury proceedings are ex parte in nature,
the circumstances surrounding the elicitation and admission of an
unavailable witness' grand jury testimony do not afford criminal defen-
dants an opportunity to cross-examine the testifying witness. 1" This
uncross-examined hearsay evidence is nevertheless admissible under
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). 3 The circuits disagree, however, on whether
the criminal defendant's lack of opportunity to cross-examine the grand
jury witness renders the hearsay testimony inadmissible under the
confrontation clause.
Four circuit courts have decided the admissibility of an
fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this ex-
ception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party suf-
ficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of
the declarant.
When witnesses are determined to be "unavailable" pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 804(a),
their grand jury testimony has been admitted into evidence by the federal circuit
courts under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). See infra note 13.
11. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5), as well as 803(24), are frequently referred to as
catch-all hearsay exceptions. See Yasser, Strangulating Hearsay: The Residual Excep-
tions to the Hearsay Rule, TEX. TECH. L. REV. 587 (1980); Note, The Federal Courts and
the Catchall Hearsay Exceptions, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1361 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Catchall Hearsay].
12. Grand jury proceedings do not provide an accused with an opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses who testify against him. See generally Note, Evidence-
Constitutional Law-The Confrontation Clause and the Catch-All Exception to the Hear-
say Doctrine, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 703 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Con-
frontation Clause and the Catch-All Exception].
13. The Fifth Circuit is the only federal circuit court that bars the admission
of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). United
States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977). Four circuit courts admit the hear-
say testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5): United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954
(6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 375 (1982), United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 936 (1978), United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
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unavailable witness' grand jury testimony.14 The Fourth," Seventh,"6
and Sixth 7 Circuits admit the hearsay testimony. These circuit courts
hold that where an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony is cor-
roborated by other admissible evidence, the testimony is reliable
enough to be admitted under the confrontation clause."i Only the Tenth
Circuit bars the admission of an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony. 9 It does so because the circumstances surrounding the
elicitation and admission of the testimony do not provide criminal
defendants with an opportunity to cross-examine the witness testify-
14. The following circuits have decided whether the admission of an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony violates the confrontation clause: the Fourth Circuit
in Garner, 574 F.2d at 1141, and West, 574 F.2d at 1131; the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); the
Seventh Circuit in Boulahanus, 677 F.2d at 586; the Sixth Circuit in Barlow, 693 F.2d
at 954. Before the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective (July 1, 1975), the Second
Circuit decided the admissibility of grand jury testimony of a witness who might have
qualified as an unavailable witness pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 804(a). United States
v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2nd Cir. 1971). This note limits discussion to instances where
the circuits have decided the admissibility of grand jury testimony of a witness
unavailable pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 804(a). Therefore, the Fiore decision will not
be discussed.
Two other circuits, the Eighth and Fifth, have also been presented with the
question of whether the admission of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony
violates the confrontation clasue. In Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1357, the Eighth Circuit found
that the defendants had waived their confrontation rights because they had brought
about the witness' unavailability. The court therefore found it unnecessary to reach
the mereits of the confrontation-hearsay issue. Id. The Fifth Circuit has on two occa-
sions failed to reach the question of whether receiving an unavailable witness' grand
jury testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5) violates a criminal defendant's right to
confrontation. In Gonzalez, 559 F.2d at 1274, the Fifth Circuit did not address the merits
of the confrontation-hearsay issue because it found the uncross-examined hearsay
testimony inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). In Thevis, 665 F.2d at 627-30,
the Fifth Circuit left the confrontation question unresolved because it found that the
defendants had waived their confrontation rights. Like the Carlson defendant, the Thev-is
defendants caused the grand jury witness' unavailability. Id. This note is not concerned
with the waiver issue, or whether an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony should
be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). Therefore, the Carlson, Gonzalez, and Thevis
decisions will not be discussed.
15. The Fourth Circuit has twice found an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony admissible under the confrontation clause. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1141; West,
574 F.2d at 1131.
16. The Seventh Circuit admitted an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony
in Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 586.
17. In Barlow, 693 F.2d at 954, the Sixth Circuit admitted an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony.
18. See infra notes 31-102 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the
Garner, West, Boulahanis, and Barlow decisions.
19. Balano, 618 F.2d at 624.
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ing against them." Although the Supreme Court has had several op-
portunities to resolve the circuit split, it has declined to do so."
This note demonstrates, by thorough examination of these cir-
cuit decisions and Supreme Court precedent, that where an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony is admitted into evidence in a criminal
proceeding, the purposes behind the confrontation clause are not
upheld. Supreme Court precedent establishes that the constitutional
protections afforded a criminal defendant entail more than a mere
determination that the evidence sought to be introduced against him
is to some degree corroborated and, therefore, reliable." The confron-
tation clause requires a much fuller factual development which, in cer-
tain circumstances, can only be satisfied by the corrective test that
cross-examination makes possible.
Discussion begins with an examination of how the circuits have
resolved the admissibility of an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony. Next, the Supreme Court's treatment of the confrontation-
hearsay issue will be analyzed. This discussion focuses upon the Court's
most recent confrontation-hearsay decisions. Careful examination of
these decisions demonstrates that the Court emphasizes cross-
examination as a protector of confrontation values. The Court's
emphasis on cross-examination in deciding confrontation issues
precludes the admission of an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony, despite the circuit court holdings to the contrary.
CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF AN
UNAVAILABLE WITNESS' GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
Since adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence, '3 the United States
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have decided the admissibility of
an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony on five separate
20. See infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the
Balano decision.
21. The Supreme Court has denied petitions for a writ of certiorari requesting
review of the admissibility of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony in the follow-
ing cases: United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 375 (1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 57, 102 S. Ct. 3489, 102 S. Ct. 2300 (1980); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
22. See infra notes 120-279 and accompanying text for discussion of Supreme
Court confrontation-hearsay decision.
23. The Federal Rules of Evidence, became effective on July 1, 1975.
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occasions.24 The fact situations in these five cases are indistinguishable
in several critical respects: in each case a witness testified against
the defendant before a grand jury, 5 the witness was unavailable to
testify at the defendant's trial,' and a transcript of the witness' grand
jury testimony was offered into evidence at the defendant's trial. 7
Despite these similarities, the circuits approached and ultimately
resolved the confrontation issue in these five cases quite differently.
The approach utilized by the circuits that admit unavailable witnesses'
grand jury testimony" views the confrontation clause as a rule of
evidence.' Here the focus of inquiry is whether the grand jury
testimony is reliable. The circuit that bars the admission of the
uncross-examined hearsay testimony views the clause as a rule of trial
procedure.2 This approach emphasizes cross-examination.
Circuits Admitting Grand Jury Testimony of Unavailable
Witnesses
The Fourth Circuit was the first of three federal appellate courts
to find that the introduction of an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony did not violate a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right
to confrontation.2 ' In United States v. West2 and its companion case
United States v. Garner," the Fourth Circuit held that where an
24. Barlow, 693 F.2d at 954; Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 589; Balano, 618 F.2d
at 624; Garner, 574 F.2d at 1146; and West, 574 F.2d at 1138.
25. Barlow, 693 F.2d at 957; Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 588; Balano, 618 F.2d
at 626; Garner, 574 F.2d at 1142; West, 574 F.2d at 1134.
26. In each of the five cases the witness was ruled unavailable to testify pur-
suant to Fed. R. Evid. 804(a). Barlow, 693 F.2d at 957; Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 589;
Balano, 618 F.2d at 626; Garner, 574 F.2d at 1143; West, 574 F.2d at 1134.
27. Barlow, 693 F.2d at 957; Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 588; Balano, 618 F.2d
at 626; Garner, 574 F.2d at 1143; West, 574 F.2d at 1134.
28. The circuits that have found that the admission of an unavailable witness'
grand jury testimony does not violate the confrontation clause are: the Fourth Circuit
in Garner, 574 F.2d at 1141, and West, 574 F.2d at 1131; the Seventh Circuit in
Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 586; and the Sixth Circuit in Barlow, 693 F.2d at 954.
29. See infra notes 31-102 and accompanying text for a full discussion of West,
Garner, Boulahanis, and Barlow.
30. The Tenth Circuit bars the admission of an unavailable witness' grand
jury testimony. Balano, 618 F.2d at 624. For full discussion of the Balano decision,
see infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
31. In West, 574 F.2d at 1138, the Fourth Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to admit an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony. The court also
admitted an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony in Garner, 574 F.2d at 1146.
Garner was decided only four days after West.
32. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
33. 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978).
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unavailable witness' grand jury testimony bears sufficient guarantees
of reliability and where the circumstances surrounding that testimony
provide the jury with a sufficient basis to judge its trustworthiness,
the admission of that evidence does not violate the confrontation
clause." The essence of this two-part test, as applied by the Fourth
Circuit, is that grand jury testimony must be reliable in order to be
admissible. To satisfy this reliability requirement, the court evaluated
the degree to which the testimony was corroborated by other admissi-
ble evidence. 5
The extent to which the grand jury testimony was corroborated
in West can only be described as extraordinary. 6 The grand jury
witness in West had been imprisoned on drug charges and agreed to
assist government agents by purchasing drugs while under police
surveillance. 7 He purchased drugs on several occasions from the ac-
cused, and thereafter testified to that fact before a grand jury. 8 Un-
fortunately, the witness was murdered by unknown persons prior to
the defendants' trial. 9 Each drug purchase was subject to elaborate
police surveillance procedures' which included photographing the drug
purchases and recording all conversations between the witness and
defendants.4 1 Furthermore, detailed summaries42 of the events at each
drug purchase were prepared by the witness and government agents
after each transaction occurred. 3 The substance of this cwrroborating
evidence, photographs, and audio recordings of the drug purchases,
along with the testimony of government agents concerning their obser-
vations of the deceased witness' activities, was introduced at the defen-
dants' trial.
34. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144; West, 574 F.2d at 1136.
35. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1145-46; West, 574 F.2d at 1137-38.
36. In Garner, 574 F.2d at 1143, the court stated that in West there existed
"extraordinary corroboration of the grand jury testimony."
37. West, 574 F.2d at 1133.
38. Id. at 1133-34.
39. The witness was murdered "in a manner suggestive of contract killers,"
having been shot four times in the head while driving his car. The defendants were
not charged with his murder. Id. at 1134. Hence, no waiver issue is presented in this
case.
40. Before each purchase the witness was strip-searched by government agents
to make sure that he possessed no drugs. The witness' car was also thoroughly searched
before each meeting with the defendants. Id. at 1133.
41. Id.
42. Id. The witness heavily relied upon these reports when testifying before
the grand jury. At the hearing the government attorney read portions of the reports
to the witness, periodically asking him if they were correct. Id. at 1134.
43. Id. at 1133.
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Similarly, the grand jury testimony at issue in Garner was also
strongly supported by corroborating evidence. The Garner defendants
were charged with numerous drug related offenses arising out of the
alleged importation of heroin from Europe." An alleged co-conspirator
testified before a grand jury that he and the defendants had made
several trips to Europe where they had purchased heroin and subse-
quently smuggled the contraband into the United States. 5 The witness
thereafter refused to testify at the defendants' trial." At that trial,
the prosecution introduced into evidence records of airline tickets,
customs declarations, passport endorsements, and European hotel
registrations, proving the witness and defendants had made several
visits to Europe during a brief time span. 7 This evidence substan-
tiated the major points of the witness' story. Furthermore, live
testimony of a young woman who had accompanied the witness and
defendants on one of their journeys to Europe "fully confirmed" the
witness' grand jury testimony as to that particular trip. 9
Relying upon this corroborative evidence, the Fourth Circuit
found that neither the West nor Garner defendants' confrontation
rights were violated by the admission of the unavailable witnesses'
grand jury testimony.' The court held that the only constitutional
limitation the sixth amendment imposes upon the admission of hear-
say staternents is the "exclusion of extra-judicial statements which
have no badges of reliability. ' 5 From this premise, a two-part test
44. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1142.
45. Id. at 1143.
46. The court found the witness to be unavailable within the meaning of Fed.
R. Evid. 804. At trial, the witness did agree to answer some questions put to him
by the defense counsel and stated that his grand jury testimony was inaccurate. He
also indicated that he knew nothing of drug trafficking. The circuit court found that
this testimony left the impression not that his grand jury testimony was false, but
that the witness was unwilling to testify. Id.
47. Id. at 1144.
48. Id. at 1145.
49. The young woman testified that she had accompanied the witness and
defendants on a trip to Amsterdam for the purpose of serving as a courier. She con-
fessed to helping the defendants smuggle the drugs into the United States from Amster-
dam. Her testimony corroborated that of the grand jury witness. Id. at 1144.
50. The court found in both West and Garner that because the grand jury
testimony was corroborated by other admissible evidence, it is admissible under the
confrontation clause. West, 574 F.2d at 1135, 1137-38; Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144-46.
51. West, 574 F.2d at 1136. The Garner opinion expressly adopted the West
holdings regarding the admissibility of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony.
The Garner court prefaced its decision by stating, "Since we have canvassed this scene
in West, we need not repeat it here." Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144.
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for determining the admissibility of an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony was established: "The admission of such sworn testimony
is not a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution if
it bears sufficient guarantees of reliability and the circumstances [sur-
rounding the testimony] contain a sufficient basis upon which the jury
may assess its trustworthiness." 2 In neither West nor Garner does
the Fourth Circuit provide a meaningful discussion of the test criterion.
However, the court clearly indicates that a criminal defendant's lack
of opportunity to cross-examination grand jury witnesses is not a
critical consideration.
Acknowledging that in several instances the Supreme Court
excluded hearsay testimony because the evidence had not been sub-
jected to cross-examination,' the Fourth Circuit nevertheless rejected
the notion that only cross-examination can provide sufficient
guarantees of reliability.' The court's application of its two-part
reliability test focused upon the circumstances surrounding the grand
jury testimony. The court reasoned that, "just as surrounding cir-
cumstances may give an assurance of reliability" to the more tradi-
tional hearsay declarations, "so surrounding circumstances may give
assurance of reliability to prior recorded testimony that was not sub-
ject at the time to cross-examination.""5 The court argued that these
same circumstances would also provide a sufficient basis upon which
to judge the testimony's trustworthiness.56
The circumstances that the Fourth Circuit found to provide suf-
52. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144. This is the same test of admissibility established
in West, 574 F.2d at 1136. The Fourth Circuit relies upon Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 89 (1970), in establishing this admissibility test. For a full discussion of the Dutton
decision, see infra notes 169-224 and accompanying text.
The same admissibility test was set out by the Eighth Circuit in Carlson, 547
F.2d at 1357. However, because the court did not reach the merits of the confronta-
tion question, an analysis of the Carlson decision is not warranted. See supra note 14.
53. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court barred the ad-
mission of uncross-examined preliminary hearing testimony. West, 574 F.2d at 1137
(citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). It also noted that in Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965), the Supreme Court barred the admission of a defendant's confes-
sion against a co-defendant because the co-defendant had been unable to cross-examine
the defendant. West, 574 F.2d at 1137. See infra notes 125-48 for full discussion of
the Pointer and Douglas decisions.
54. The specific language of the court was: "The Supreme Court has never
intimated, however, that cross-examination is the only means by which prior recorded
testimony may be qualified for admission under the Confrontation Clause." West, 574
F.2d at 1137.
55. Id.
56. Id.
1984]
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ficient "indicia of reliability" and a sufficient basis upon which to judge
trustworthiness were the articles of evidence which corroborated the
unavailable witnesses' grand jury testimony: in West, the testimony
of the government agents who worked on the case, as well as the
photographs and audio recordings of the witness' drug purchases; 7
in Garner, the European travel records and the testimony of the young
woman who accompanied the witness and defendants on one of their
trips to Europe.' In both decisions, the court acknowledged that these
same circumstances were found to satisfy the trustworthiness require-
ment of Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)., 9 As such, the West and Garner deci-
sions may reduce the confrontation clause to the status of a mere
evidentiary rule."0
In several instances, the circumstances surrounding the grand
jury testimony in West and Garner indicated that the hearsay evidence
was unreliable. The Fourth Circuit gave little or no weight to these
considerations. Limited significance was accorded to the witnesses'
backgrounds and motives for testifying before the grand jury as possi-
ble indicators of unreliability. Both witnesses had criminal records and
their testimony was secured as part of plea bargain agreements."
Logically, the witnesses' desire to avoid incarceration would motivate
them to testify to facts favorable to the prosecution, regardless of
57. Id. at 1137-38.
58. The court emphasized that the defendant's limited opportunity to cross-
examine the grand jury witness did not satisfy its admissibility test. See infra note
46. The court stated:
We do not hold, however, that this cross-examination under these dif-
ficult circumstances was adequate to meet the requirements of the Con-
frontation Clause. . . . It is enough that the grand jury testimony was
admissible because of its strong corroboration by the testimony of Miss
McKee [the young woman who accompanied the defendants to Europe]
and the undeniable [travel] records.
Garner, 574 F.2d at 1146.
59. Id. at 1146; West, 574 F.2d at 1138.
60. In the West dissent Judge Widener argues that the majority's treatment
of the confrontation issue in West reduces the confrontation clause "to the status of
a mere rule of evidence." West, 574 F.2d at 1139 (Widener, J., dissenting). He also
contends that by viewing confrontation as a question of reliability, the West majority
equates the confrontation clause and hearsay rule. Id. The Tenth Circuit shares these
views: "We believe, however, that West improperly reduces the confrontation clause
to a mere consideration of evidentiary value." Balano, 618 F.2d at 627. See infra notes
103-19 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the West dissenting opinion and
the Balano decision.
61. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1142-43; West, 574 F.2d at 1133-34.
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their accuracy.2 The Fourth Circuit failed to consider this possibility
in Garner,' while in West it flatly rejected this scenario, finding that
the elaborate surveillance techniques employed by government agents
made it inconceivable that the witness could deceive them. 4 Moreover,
because the witness was cognizant of the surveillance and verifica-
tion procedures being utilized, he knew that any attempted deception
would probably fail and that he would thereby lose the prosecution's
favor. The court held that these factors gave tha witness every in-
centive to be extremely accurate when testifying, providing yet
another indicator of the grand jury testimony's reliability. 5
The implications of the West and Garner holdings are clear.
Where the grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness is cor-
roborated in part, the admission of that testimony is not barred by
the sixth amendment. The essence of the Fourth Circuit's admissibility
test is not whether there is adequate confrontation of the witness
by the defendant, but whether that witness' testimony appears
reliable."
Reliability is also the focus of the Seventh Circuit's constitutional
inquiry when determining the admissibility of an unavailable witness'
grand jury testimony. The Seventh Circuit also holds that the ad-
mission of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony does not
62. Comment, Evidence-Hearsay-Applicability of Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(5) to Grand Jury Testimony, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 416, 424 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Evidence-Hearsay].
63. The court-did discuss the witness' recantation of his grand jury testimony.
It concluded that the witness' trial appearance and testimony may have aided the
jury in assessing the truthfulness of the grand jury testimony. Garner, 574 F.2d at
1146. This determination is contrary to the holdings of Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1346, and
Gonzalez, 559 F.2d at 1271. There the Eighth and Fifth Circuits held that the reaffir-
mation for recantation of a witness' grand jury testimony is a determinative factor
in deciding whether the testimony possesses "equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1354; Gonzalez,
559 F.2d at 1274. The Fourth Circuit held that the Federal Rules of Evidence "cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" were the very same circumstances that
permit admission of grand jury testimony under the confrontation clause. See supra
notes 57-59 and accompanying text. Thus, the recantation provides an indication of
unreliability that the Garner court failed to consider in resolving the admissibility
of the grand jury testimony.
64. West, 574 F.2d at 1135.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1139 (Widener, J., dissenting).
67. United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 589 (7th Cir. 1982) (the court
admitted an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony because its content was prob-
ably true).
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violate the confrontation clause if the testimony appears sufficiently
reliable. 8 Like West and Garner, the court emphasizes corroboration
as a means of satisfying the reliability requirement.6 9
The fact situation of the case decided by the Seventh Circuit
parallels that of West and Garner. The defendants were accused of
extortion."0 The government alleged that they had gone to a Chicago
social club, beaten the club's proprietor, destroyed several articles
of furniture, and returned the following evening threatening the pro-
prietor with similar incidents unless he paid them protection money. 1
A witness testified before a grand jury that he was present at the
club on the nights the alleged incidents occurred." He testified that
he observed the defendants beat the club proprietor on .the first even-
ing and return te following night." Fearing for his safety, the witness
refused to testify at the defendants' trial.74 As in the Fourth Circuit
decisions, live testimony of eyewitnesses and an audio recording cor-
roborated the grand jury testimony. The in-court testimony of several
unidentified eyewitnesses" corroborated the grand jury testimony "on
most points." 6 An audio recording of the club proprietor's meeting
with the defendants on the second evening77 corroborated the grand
68. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
69. In admitting the unavailable witness' grand jury testimony, the Seventh
Circuit emphasized that the testimony was "corroborated by other highly probative
evidence." Other factors found by the court to help satisfy the reliability requirement
were that the witness was under oath when testifying before the grand jury and that
his statements were made voluntarily. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 589.
70. Id. at 587
71. The defendants told the club proprietor "that if he did not pay them $300
for the past month and $500 per month thereafter for allowing gambling in the club,
they would shut it down, while if he did pay, they would not 'terrorize nobody more
in here,' but would beat up anyone else who was trying to extort money" from the
club. Id.
72. Id. at 588.
73. Id.
74. The witness feared he would be killed if he testified. The club proprietor
had been murdered by persons unknown prior to the defendants' trial. The opinion
clearly indicates, however, that no threats were made to the witness by the defen-
dants regarding his testifying at their trial. Id. Thus, the issue of waiver is not present.
75. The opinion only identifies one of the eyewitnesses, and fails to indicate
the specific facts to which the eyewitnesses testified.
76. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 588.
77. Prior to the events of the second evening, the club proprietor went to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to report the incident of the prior evening.
The FBI equipped him with a recording device which was strapped to his ankle. He
wore the device that evening and thereby recorded his conversation with the defen-
dants. It was that very conversation in which the defendants threatened the proprietor
with further violence. Id. at 587.
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jury testimony "at every point. '78 This corroborating evidence
ultimately provided the principal means by which the defendants' con-
victions were secured."9
The approach utilized by the Seventh Circuit in deciding the ad-
missibility of the unavailable witness' grand jury testimony remained
that of determining whether there existed sufficient corroborative
evidence to ascertain that the testimony was reliable." However, the
admissibility test enunciated by the Seventh Circuit differs from that
articulated by the Fourth." The Seventh Circuit deems hearsay
testimony admissible under the confrontation clause if the witness of-
fering the hearsay testimony is subject to cross-examination, and the
circumstances under which the hearsay statements are made indicate
that its content is "probably true."82 The court found the cross-
examination requirement inapplicable to the case at bar because the
accuracy of the transcript in recording the grand jury testimony was
not challenged. 3 This holding was premised upon the court's belief
that the purpose of the cross-examination requirement is to assure
that the hearsay statement is accurately reported.' The court found
the truthfulness requirement satisfied by the highly probative cor-
roborating evidence: the live testimony of the eyewitnesses and the
audio recording of the defendants' conversation with the club
proprietor. Accordingly, the court found no sixth amendment viola-
tion in admitting the grand jury testimony. 6
78. Id. at 588.
79. Id. at 589.
80. The test employed by the Seventh Circuit required hearsay statements
to be "probably true" for them to be admissible under the confrontation clause. The
court determined that evidence corroborating the grand jury testimony met the
truthfulness requirement. Id.
81. The test enunciated in Garner and West required that hearsay testimony
bear sufficient guarantees of reliability and the circumstances surrounding that
testimony provide the jury with a sufficient basis to judge its trustworthiness. See
supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
82. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 589. To support its test of admissibility, the court
cites Davis v. Franzen, 671 F.2d 1056, 1058 (7th Cir. 1982). In Franzen the Seventh
Circuit emphasized that it would continue to follow the Dutton plurality opinion. The
court stated that it extracted from that opinion the proposition that the confrontation
clause does not bar the admission of hearsay statements when the witness offering
the hearsay statement is cross-examined and the circumstances surrounding the state-
ment indicate that the statement is true. Id. at 1058 For discussion of Dutton see
infra notes 169-224 and accompanying text.
83. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 589.
84. Id.
85. In holding that the truthfulness requirement was satisfied by the cor-
roborative evidence, the court cited the West decision. Id. (citing West, 574 F.2d at
1136-38).
86. Id.
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The third and final circuit court to admit an unavailable witness'
grand jury testimony also adopts the reliability approach. The Sixth
Circuit agrees that the admission of an unavailable witness' grand
jury testimony does not violate a criminal defendant's right to
confrontation.17 The admissibility test enunciated by the court, that
an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony must possess adequate
"indicia of reliability,"88 is very similar to the test established in West
and Garner.' However, while the Fourth Circuit primarily relied upon
corroborative evidence to satisfy the reliability requirement, the Sixth
Circuit considers additional factors."
The facts of the case decided by the Sixth Circuit are unique.
A witness testified before a grand jury that, contrary to the defen-
dant's alibi, she was not with the accused at the time of his alleged
theft. 1 Thereafter, the witness married the defendant, and at his trial,
exercised her privilege not to testify against her spouse.' The trial
court declared the witness unavailable pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.
804(a)93 and admitted her grand jury testimony into evidence.
The Sixth Circuit determined that three considerations provid-
ed the witness' grand jury testimony with sufficient "indicia of
reliability:" 5 the existence of other admissible evidence corroborating
87. United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 965 (6th Cir. 1982).
88. In establishing its admissibility test, the Sixth Circuit cited Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Supreme Court's most recent confrontation-hearsay decision.
Despite relying upon Roberts in establishing its admissibility test, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that Roberts did not provide much guidance in resolving the issue before
it. The court found that Roberts "left unresolved ... whether prior cross-examination,
or the opportunity to cross-examine, is essential to satisfy the constitutional re-
quirements." Id. at 963-64. See infra notes 245-67 and accompanying text for full discus-
sion of Roberts.
89. The admissibility test established by the Sixth Circuit is identical to the
first part of the Fourth Circuit's admissibility test, that hearsay testimony must bear
sufficient guarantees of reliability. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Fourth Circuit admissibility test. However, the admissibility test
articulated in West, 574 F.2d at 1136, and Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144, includes the re-
quirement that the circumstances surrounding the testimony provide a sufficient basis
for the jury to judge truthfulness. The Barlow admissibility test does not.
90. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
91. Barlow, 693 F.2d at 957.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 961.
94. Id. at 957.
95. To support its determination that cross-examination of a hearsay declarant
is not a prerequisite for the grand jury testimony's admission, and that the testimony
possessed adequate "indicia of reliability," the court relied upon Dutton, 400 U.S. at
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the witness' statements," the witness' personal knowledge of the facts
to which she testified, and the absence of any motive for the witness
to lie or embellish her story." The court failed to identify the cor-
roborating evidence. 8 Neither did it explain whey the witness had
no motive to lie. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit found the grand jury
testimony admissible under the confrontation clause.9
As was the case in West and Garner,°0 the Sixth Circuit
acknowledged that the approach it had adopted, in determining the
admissibility of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony under
the confrontation clause, parallelled that utilized to determine ad-
missibility under the hearsay rules. ' The court conceded that from
its opinion it would appear that the confrontation clause and Fed. R.
Evid. 804(b)(5) are functional equivalents.' °2 This argument, that the
admissibility tests employed by the Fourth, Seventh, and Sixth Cir-
cuits relegate the confrontation clause to the status of a mere eviden-
tiary rule, has become the focal point of those who contend that the
sixth amendment bars the admission of an unavailable witness' grand
jury testimony.
The Circuit Barring Grand Jury Testimony of Unavailable
Witnesses
Only one circuit holds that the admission of an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony violates a criminal defendant's right
74. Barlow, 693 F.2d at 964-65. The Sixth Circuit held that the very same factors which
supplied the necessary "indicia of reliability in Dutton were also present in Barlow.
Id. at 965. For a full discussion of Dutton, see supra notes 169-224 and accompanying
text.
96. The Sixth Circuit placed less emphasis on the presence of corroborating
evidence. The court's reasons for so doing may lie with the unique nature of the grand
jury testimony. Unlike West, Garner, and Boulahanis, the grand jury testimony in
Barlow provided only circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt. In discussing
the admissibility of the testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5), the court held that
where testimony does not relate direct evidence of criminal activity, the amount of
corroboration required to provide the necessary circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness need not be as great. Barlow, 693 F.2d at 962.
97. Id. at 965.
98. The Barlow opinion only indicates that the corroborating evidence is both
physical and testimonial. Id. at 962.
99. Id. at 965.
100. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
101. Barlow, 693 F.2d at 965.
102. The specific language used by the court was, "as discussed in the text,
it would appear from the analysis of this case that Rule 804(b)(5) and the confrontation
clause are functional equivalents." Id. at 965 n.10.
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to confront the witnesses gainst him."0 3 Conceding that the confronta-
tion clause does not altogether bar the admission of uncross-examined
hearsay testimony against criminal defendants, 4 the Tenth Circuit °5
nevertheless opposes dispensing with cross-examination as a required
element of confrontation when hearsay evidence consists of an
unavailable witness' grant jury testimony. Accordingly, in United
States v. Balano, the court barred the admission of the hearsay
testimony because the defendant had not been afforded an opportunity
to cross-examine the grand jury witness.0 6
The approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit in deciding the ad-
missibility question is essentially that which was advocated in Judge
Widener's dissenting opinion in West. Judge Widener argues that the
approach employed by the West majority, that of ascertaining whether
the prior testimony is in fact truthful, relegates the confrontation
clause to the status of an evidentiary rule. °7 His dissent maintains
that the confrontation clause was intended to regulate trial procedure
in criminal actions by compelling the physical presence of the accusor
before the defendant and jury.' He postulates that the proper ap-
proach should be one of determining whether there is adequate
physical confrontation. 9 Employing this line of reasoning, Judge
Widener concluded that the nature of grand jury proceedings is such
that the admission of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony
is equivalent to "trial by affidavit, the very practice against which
103. Balano, 618 F.2d at 624. The waiver question was presented in Balano,
the defendants having caused the grand jury witness' unavailability. Id. at 626. However,
dissimilar to the Eighth and Fifth Circuits (see supra note 14), the Tenth Circuit found
it necessary to decide whether a confrontation violation exists before resolving the
waiver issue. Balano, 618 F.2d at 626.
104. Id. at 628.
105. This portion of the majority opinion reflects only the analysis of its author,
Judge McKay. Id. at 626. In the concurring opinion, Judges Holloway and Logan neither
agreed nor disagreed with Judge McKay's analysis. They found it unnecessary to deter-
mine whether the defendant's confrontation rights were violated because the defen-
dant had waived his confrontation rights. Id. at 633 n.3 (Holloway, J. and Logan, J.,
concurring).
106. Id. at 628.
107. Justice Widener stated, "The majority's treatment of the confrontation
clause ... reduces the constitutional provision to the status of a mere rule of evidence."
West, 574 F.2d at 1139 (Widener, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1140.
109. Justice Widener emphasized that "the whole question is not, as the majority
treats it, whether the testimony is in fact truthful; rather, the issue is whether there
has been such 'adequate confrontation' as to satisfy the requirements of the Constitu-
tion's Sixth Amendment." Id. at 1139 (citing Dutton, 400 U.S. at 97 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
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the Confrontation Clause was designed to protect.""' Consequently,
the West dissent found the prior testimony inadmissible."'
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the approach employed by the
West majority, holding that the Fourth Circuit had erroneously sub-
jugated the confrontation clause "to a mere consideration of eviden-
tiary value."...2 The court concurred with the West majority that cross-
examination is not the only means of qualifying prior recorded
testimony for admission under the confrontation clause. However, the
Tenth Circuit emphasized the importance the Supreme Court has
placed upon cross-examination as a protector of confrontation." 3 Argu-
ing that the inherent veracity of hearsay statements was not the sole
concern of the confrontation clause, the Tenth Circuit found that the
ultimate constitutional prescription of the clause was one of regulating
trial procedure.114 Hence, the court held the admission of an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony to be equivalent to trying a defendant
on evidence consisting of ex parte depositions, the particular vice the
confrontation clause was meant to suppress.'5 Here the court
emphsized that it was the prosecution who had secured the witness'
grand jury testimony."' Maintaining that gran jury proceedings no
longer functioned as protectors of individual rights, it characterized
grand juries as agents of the prosecution, and as the arm of the ex-
amining magistrate." ' Accordingly, the court found that when the pros-
ecution itself secures hearsay testimony, as is the case with grand
jury testimony, that it was "unwilling to dispense with cross-
examination as a required element of confrontation." 9.. It therefore
decided that the admission of the unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony violates the sixth amendment."9 In so holding, the Tenth
Circuit created a split among the federal circuit courts of appeal.
110. Id. at 1140.
111. Id. at 1141.
112. Balano, 618 F2.d at 627.
113. Id. at 628.
114. The specific language of the court was:
The Confrontation Clause is not concerned only with the inherent veracity
of hearsay statements. "[Wle should not be lured by the possible reliability
of out-of-court statements, important as that is in the consideration of
the problem as a rule of evidence, away from the ultimate constitutional
prescription [of the Confrontation Clause], which is the regulation of trial
procedure."
Id. at 627 (quoting West, 574 F.2d at 1139 (Widener, J., dissenting)).
115. Id. (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970)).
116. Id. at 627-28.
117. Id. at 627.
118. Id. at 628.
119. Id.
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The discrepancy among the circuits concerning the admissibility
of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony reflects the circuits'
disagreement over what are the true purposes of the confrontation
clause. The circuits finding such evidence admissible contend that the
purpose of the confrontation clause is to ensure that only reliable
evidence will be admitted against defendants. The circuit holding that
such prior testimony is inadmissible suggests that the real purpose
of confrontation is to compel the physical presence of a witness before
the defendant and jury. Ascertaining which is the true purpose of
the confrontation clause requires a careful examination of Supreme
Court precedent.
SUPREME COURT CONFRONTATION-HEARSAY DECISIONS
Supreme Court precedent provides minimal guidance for re-
solving the constitutionality of admitting into evidence an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony.2 ' In addition to never having decided
the issue, the Supreme Court has failed to set out a coherent theory
clarifying the relationship between confrontation and hearsay. Com-
mentators roundly criticize the Court for its inability to reconcile the
confrontation clause and the hearsay rule. 2' One commentator refers
to the Court's recent confrontation-hearsay decisions as "at best in-
consistent and, at worst, irreconcilable. ' '
The Court's attempts to determine the proper relationship be-
tween confrontation and hearsay have produced two differing views
of the confrontation clause. One line of the Court's confrontation-
120. Much of the Supreme Court's analysis of the right to confrontation and
its relationship to hearsay evidence appears in recent decisions. Note, Right of Con-
frontation, supra note 8, at 146. The confrontation clause was not applied to the states
until 1965. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406-07. Since that time, the Court's consideration of
the confrontation-hearsay issue has increased dramatically. From 1965 until 1973, the
Court decided eight confrontation-hearsay decisions of considerable import: Chamber
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Dutton, 400
U.S. at 74; Green, 399 U.S. at 149; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Douglas, 380 U.S. at 415; Pointer, 380 U.S. at 400. There
has been just one notable confrontation-hearsay decision handed down since that time,
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56.
121. See generally Baker, supra note 7, at 529; Graham, The Confrontation Clause,
the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX, L. REV. 151 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Graham]; Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh
Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972); Natali, supra note 6, at 43. Seidelson, Hear-
say Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76 (1971); Weston, supra
note 8, at 1185; Younger, supra note 2, at 32; Note, Right of Confrontation, supra note
8, at 127.
122. Natali, supra note 6, 47.
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hearsay decisions view the clause as a guarantee of physical confron-
tation, namely cross-examination.' These cases indicate that the sixth
amendment is violated where there is no opportunity for criminal
defendants to cross-examine the witnesses testifying against them.
The Court's most recent confrontation-hearsay decisions view the con-
frontation clause as a guarantee against the admission of unreliable
evidence."4 Both views merit a thorough analysis Discussion begins
with an examination of the notion that confrontation guarantees
cross-examination.
Confrontation as a Guarantee of Cross Examination
In several confrontation-hearsay decisions, the Supreme Court
accentuated the relationship between confrontation and cross-
examination, indicating that the lack of opportunity to cross-examine
certain hearsay declarants violates a criminal defendant's right to
confrontation.'25 These decisions view the confrontation clause as a
guarantee of cross-examination.12 Three relatively recent Supreme
Court opinions embrace this view. These decisions, Pointer v. Texas, 7
Douglas v. Alabama,"8 and Bruton v. United States," are the subject
of frequent commentary."' An examination of the factual settings and
holdings of these cases is essential to an understanding of the Court's
reasoning in these decisions.
123. See infra notes 125-68 and accompanying text for a full discussion of these
Supreme Court decisions.
124. See infra notes 169-267 and accompanying text for a full discussion of these
decisions.
125. See generally Younger, supra note 2, at 32; Comment, Admission at Trial
of Slain Informants Prior Grand Jury Testimony, supra note 2, at 682; Note, Right
of Confrontation, supra note 8, at 127.
126. See e.q., Younger, supra note 2, at 32-35; Note, Right of Confrontation, supra
note 8, at 130-32.
127. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
128. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
129. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
130. Two other recent Supreme Court decisions, California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149 (1970), and Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), also adopt the view that the con-
frontation clause guarantees cross-examination. In Barber the Court refused to admit
the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness not present at the defendant's trial
because he was incarcerated. 390 U.S. at 726. The Court found the witness not
"unavailable" because good faith efforts of the prosecution to obtain his presence at
trial were not made. Id. at 723-25. In Green the Court permitted the admission of
a witness' preliminary hearing testimony because the witness was available at trial
for cross-examination. 399 U.S. at 153-65. Dictum in both decisions suggests that the
preliminary hearing testimony would be admissible had the witness been unavailable
at trial for cross-examination. In Barber the Court states:
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The Pointer decision provides a factual setting analogous to that
of the admission of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony. At
a preliminary hearing, a criminal defendant, who was without counsel,
was identified by a witness as the perpetrator of a robbery.' The
defendant did not cross-examine the witness at the hearing."2 Having
moved out of state, the witness was not available to testify at the
defedant's trial. l3 As a result, at trial the prosecution introduced into
evidence the transcript of the witness' preliminary hearing
testimony.'
Using strong language, the Court found that the admission of
the preliminary hearing testimony violated the defendant's right to
confrontation because the accused was not afforded an adequate op-
portunity to cross-examine the witness.13 ' The Court emphasized that
Moreover, we would reach the same result on the facts of this case had
petitioner's counsel actually cross-examined Woods at the preliminary hear-
ing .... The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to
weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily
a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial,
simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether
probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. While there may be
some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination
of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demand of the confron-
tation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable, this
is not, as we have pointed out, such a case.
390 U.S. 725-26. The specific language of the Court in Green is to the same effect:
We also think that Porter's preliminary hearing testimony was admissi-
ble as far as the Constitution is concerned wholly apart from the ques-
tion of whether respondent had an effective opportunity for confronta-
tion at the subsequent trial. For Porter's statement at the preliminary
hearing had already been given under circumstances closely approximating
those that surround the typical trial.
399 U.S. at 165. As dicta, the Court's remarks in Barber and Green are of limited value.
The purpose of this note is to determine the admissibility of grand jury testimony
of witnesses whose unavailability is not disputed. Because Barber and Green turn on
the availability of the hearsay declarant to testify at the defendant's trial, an analysis
of these decisions is not warranted. The Supreme Court decisions discussed in this
portion of the note involve the testimony of witnesses whose availability at trial is
not questioned by the Court.
131. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 401.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The Court held that:
Under this Court's prior decisions, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
confrontation and cross-examination was unquestionably denied petitioner
in this case .... Because the transcript of Phillips' statement offered against
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the primary purpose of the confrontation clause is to provide criminal
defendants with the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses testify-
ing against them.3 In so holding, the Court recognized the indispen-
sability of cross-examination in assuring the accuracy of the truthfin-
ding process. The Court distinctly stated:
It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that
the right of cross-examination is included in the right of
an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses
against him. And probably no one, certainly no one ex-
perienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of
cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out
the truth in the trial of a criminal case.3
Thus, at the core of the Pointer decision is the Court's belief that
cross-examination is essential to the truthfinding process, so as to
guarantee criminal defendants a constitutionally fair trial. '38
The implications of the Pointer decision are obvious. If a criminal
defendant's right to confrontation is offended by the admission of an
unavailable witness' preliminary hearing testimony merely because
the defendant is without counsel at that hearing, and thereby not pro-
vided with an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness, sure-
ly a defendant's confrontation rights are violated when the defendant
has no right whatsoever to cross-examine the witness. Such is the
case when an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony is admitted
petitioner at his trial had not been taken at a time and under circumstances
affording petitioner through counsel an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine Phillips, its introduction in a federal court in a criminal case
against Pointer would have amounted to denial of the privilege of con-
frontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 406-07.
136. The specific language of the Court was, "As has been pointed out, a major
reason underlying the constitutional rule is to give a defendant charged with crime
an opportunity to cross-examine the witnessess against him." Id.
137. Id. at 404.
138. The Court stressed the fundamental nature of the right to cross-examine
witnesses, stating:
There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts
have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that
the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fun-
damental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's
constitutional goal. Indeed, we have expressly declared that to deprive
an accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is a
denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law.
Id. at 405.
1984]
Weihmuller: Admissibility of an Unavailable Witness' Grand Jury Testimony: Up
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
986 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
into evidence. Similar to a preliminary hearing, the function of a grand
jury proceeding is to determine whether probable cause exists to
believe a crime has been committed."9 Preliminary hearings, however,
are primarily adversarial, affording the accused an opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses who testify against him, call his own
witnesses, and introduce evidence proving his innocence. " Grand jury
proceedings are ex parte in nature. At grand jury hearings, the accused
has no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him."'
He is not provided an opportunity to present evidence on his own
behalf, nor is the prosecuting attorney obligated to do so.' Had the
Pointer defendant himself sought to question the witness at the
preliminary hearing and the court denied him an opportunity to do
so, his situation would be analogous to that of an accused indicted
by a grand jury. The Pointer decision, therefore, implies that the con-
frontation clause bars the admission of an unavailable witness' grand
jury testimony. The Court's holdings in Douglas v. Alabama,". Pointer's
companion case, also indicate that the introduction of the grand jury
testimony violates the confrontation clause.
In Douglas, the Court again suggests that the lack of opportuni-
ty to cross-examine witnesses violates the confrontation clause. In this
case, an accomplice's confession, inculpating the defendant, was read
to the jury despite its inadmissibility as evidence."' The accomplice,
who had already been tried and convicted, refused to testify, asser-
ting his privilege against self-incrimination. " 5 In light of the defedant's
inability to cross-examine his accomplice, the Court found that the
139. Keeney & Walsh, American Bar Association's Grand Jury Principles: A
Critique From a Federal Criminal Justice Perspective, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 545, 550 (1978).
140. See generally Y. KAMISOR, W. LAFAVE. & J.ISRAEL. MODERN CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE, 1000-007 (5th ed. 1980).
141. See generally Lewis, The Grand Jury: A Critical Evaluation, 13 AKRON
L. REV. 33 (1979).
142. Because the prosecution has no affirmative duty to present or disclose
evidence which tends to negate the accused guilt, grand jury proceedings do not pro-
vide the "full story" surrounding the accused guilt or innocence. See e.g., Comment,
Grand Jury-Prosecuting Attorney Generally Not Obligated to Present Evidence Favorable
to the Defense, 11 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 359 (1980). Thus, when the prosecution examines grand
jury witnesses, he only attempts to elicit testimony unfavorable to the accused. As
such, the testimony of a grand jury witness tends to be one sided, and does not pro-
vide a full factual development of what the witness has seen or heard.
143. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
144. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 417-18.
145. Id. at 416.
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defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation had been
violated.'4
The Court emphasized that the primary interest secured by the
confrontation clause was the right of a criminal defendant to cross-
examine witnesses testifying against him:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in ques-
tion was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits
• . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness in which
the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief.'47
Implicit in the Douglas decision is the Court's belief that a constitu-
tionally fair trial mandates the kind of factual development that can
only be made possible through the corrective test of cross-examination.
Because the circumstances surrounding an unavailable witness' grand
jury testimony do not allow cross-examination of the hearsay declarant,
such evidence is not subject to the type of factual development that
the confrontation clause requires. Thus, like Pointer, the Douglas deci-
sion indicates that the confrontation clause bars the admission of an
unavailable witness' grand jury testimony. The same is true of Bruton
v. United States,'48 another Supreme Court decision that emphasizes
cross-examination in determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence.
The fact situation of Bruton is analogous to that of Douglas. The
confession of a co-defendant, inculpating the defendant, was admitted
into evidence.'49 The trial court carefully instructed the jury that the
confession was admissible only against the co-defendant and that it
should be disregarded in determining the defendant's guilt or
4nnocence. 15 The co-defendant chose not to testify at trial and hence,
146. The specific language of the Court was, "In the circumstances of this case,
petitioners inability to cross-examine Loyd [the accomplice] as to the alleged confes-
sion plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation
Clause." Id. at 419.
147. Id. (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43).
148. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
149. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124.
150. Id. at 125.
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the defendant was unable to cross-examine him."' Having determined
that there was substantial risk that the jury considered the co-
defendant's confession in determining the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence despite the trial court's limiting instructions, the Court was
left with the question of whether the defendant's sixth amendment
right to confrontation had been violated."
Quoting numerous passages from Pointer and Douglas, the Court
found that the defendant's right to confrontation was violated because
he was not provided with an opportunity to cross-examine his
co-defendant.'53 Again, the Court emphasized that the right to con-
frontation implies the right of cross-examination.' It stressed that
cross-examination of witnesses is the primary purpose of the confron-
tation clause.' 5 The implication of the Bruton decision is clear. Viewed
as a guarantee of cross-examination, the confrontation clause should
bar the introduction of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony
because the circumstances surrounding the admission of that testimony
do not permit cross-examination of the hearsay declarant.
Implicit in the Bruton decision, as well as in Pointer and Douglas,
is the importance the Supreme Court attaches to cross-examination
in assuring the accuracy of the truthfinding process in its full con-
text. Underlying the Court's determination that the confrontation
clause guarantees cross-examination is the belief that a constitutionally
fair trial requires the kind of factual development that can only be
provided through the corrective test of cross-examination. Referred
to as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth,"'56 the value of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and
bringing out the truth at the trial of a criminal defendant has never
been disputed.15 Cross-examination not only permits the defendant
151. Id. at 128.
152. Id. at 126.
153. The specific language used by the Court was: "Plainly the Evans' [co-
defendant] confession added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Govern-
ment's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since Evans did not take the
stand. petitioner thus was denied his constitutional right of confrontation." Id. at 127-28.
154. Quoting Pointer, the Court maintained "that the right of cross-examination
is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses
against him' secured by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 126 (quoting Pointer, 380 U.S.
at 404).
155. Id.
156. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1367 (3d ed. 1940).
157. "In spite of abuses and frequently unskillful management it is recognized
by all American courts and all courts under the English system of jurisprudence as
being an indispensible tool in litigation." R. REDFIELD, CROSS EXAMINATION AND THE
WITNESS 13 (1963).
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a means by which to test the accuracy of a witness' prior statements,
it affords the defendant an opportunity to explore the breadth of a
witness' testimony. 58 It enables the defendant "to test the witness'
recollection, to probe into the details of his alibi, or to sift his
conscience,' ' 9 so as to ensure that the "full story" is made known
to the fact finder. The absence of cross-examination calls into ques-
tion the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding procedure. 6 '
Admittedly, the emphasis Pointer, Douglas, and Bruton place
upon cross-examination as a protector of confrontation values is in-
consistent with the Court's prior determination that dying
declarations 8 ' are admissible under the confrontation clause.'62 The
circumstances surrounding the making of a dying declaration, and its
admission into evidence, never afford criminal defendants an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant." The admissibility of
this uncross-examined hearsay testimony is contrary to the Court's
equation of confrontation and cross-examination in Pointer, Douglas,
and Bruton. If the confrontation clause is truly a guarantee of cross-
examination, as these three cases suggest, dying declarations should
not be admissible.
The Court failed to reconcile its holdings in Pointer, Douglas,
and Bruton with the admissibility of dying declarations. 4 In Douglas
and Bruton, the admissibility of dying declarations is not even dis-
cussed. In Pointer, the Court acknowledged the admissibility of dy-
ing declarations and noted that there may exist "analogous situations
which might not fall within the scope of the constitutional rule re-
158. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the Court found that a
criminal defendant was denied due process because a state evidentiary rule prevented
a criminal defendant from cross-examining a witness. The Court stressed the impor-
tance of cross-examination as a means by which to ensure the accuracy of the truth-
finding process. "The right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial
procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure
the accuracy of the truthfinding process." Id. at 295.
159. Id. (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242).
160. Id. (citing Berger v. California, 393 U.S. at 242-43).
161. Statements made by a declarant while believing that his death is immi-
nent, concerning-the circumstances surrounding-his death are-dying declarations. See
generally MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §282 at 680-81 (E. Cleary
2d ed. 1972). Generally, they are only admissible in criminal homicide prosecutions
where the defendant is charged with the death of the declarant. Id.
162. The Supreme Court recognized the admissibility of dying declarations in
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240-44.
163. Dying declarations are admissible at trial only if the declarant is dead.
See supra note 161. Thus, there is no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at trial.
164. E.g., Younger, supra note 2, at 33-35.
1984]
Weihmuller: Admissibility of an Unavailable Witness' Grand Jury Testimony: Up
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
)90 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
quiring confrontation of witnesses."' 165 However, no argument was ad-
vanced by the Court to distinguish its decision from the admissibility
of dying declarations. Without explanation, it summarily decided that
the circumstances surrounding the admission of an unavailable witness'
preliminary hearing testimony do not present an "analogous
situation." '
The Court's inability to reconcile its holdings in Pointer, Douglas,
and Bruton, with the admissibility of dying declarations is not sur-
prising. The admissibility of dying declarations is premised upon the
notion that the circumstances under which dying declarations are
made, the declarant's sense of impending death, render them inherent-
ly truthful.6 ' This suggests that the confrontation clause does not
guarantee cross-examination, but that it merely ensures that only
reliable evidence will be admissible against criminal defendants.' 1 The
Court expressly adopts this view of the confrontation clause in three
subsequent confrontation-hearsay decisions.
165. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407.
166. Id.
167. Acknowledging the admissibility of dying declarations, the Court held that
"the sense of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood."
Mqttox, 146 U.S. at 244 (citing Mattox, 146 U.S. 140, at 142). This assumption is the
subject of recent critical commentary. E.g., Baker, supra note 7, at 550. The limita-
tions generally imposed upon dying declarations, that they are admissible only in
criminal homocide prosecutions where the defendant is charged with the death of the
declarant, are inconsistent with the Court's determination that the statements are
inherently truthful. Id.
168. The admissibility of dying declarations does not suggest that an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony is admissible. Dying declarations are admissible because
the circumstances surrounding their elicitation, the declarant's sense of impending death,
render the statements inherently reliable. The nature of grand jury proceedings is
such that an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony could not be regarded as in-
herently reliable. Grand jury proceedings are one-sided affairs controlled by the pro-
secution. See supra note 142. They are referred to as the "agent of the prosecution,"
"tool of the executive," and "arm of the examining magistrate." See M. FRANKEL &
G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY 99-102 (1977); Comment, Grand Jury-Prosecuting Attorney
Generally Not Obligated to Present Evidence Favorable to the Defense, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.
J. 359 (1980). See also Balano, 618 F.2d at 618 (nature of grand jury proceedings are a
critical consideraton in finding grand jury testimony inadmissible). Because grand jurys
not bound by normal evidentiary rules, they are allowed to hear evidence too unreliable
to be admitted at trial. Lewis, The Grand Jury: A Critical Evaluation, 13 AKRON L.
REV. 33 at 49 (1979). For example, a grand jury witness' hearsay testimony is admissible
as evidence at a grand jury hearing even if the hearsay statement does not fall under
a traditional hearsay exception. As such, an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony
cannot be characterized as inherently reliable. The admissibility of dying declarations
is, therefore, distinguishable from the inadmissibility of an unavailable witness' grand
jury testimony.
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Confrontation as a Guarantee Against the Admission of Unreliable
Evidence
Three of the Supreme Court's most recent confrontation-hearsay
decisions"6 9 abandon the view that a criminal defendant's lack of op-
portunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him violates the con-
frontation clause. Deciding that the admission of hearsay evidence
bearing sufficient "indicia of reliability" does not offend the confron-
tation clause, Dutton v. Evans,7' Mancusi v. Stubbs,7 ' and Ohio v.
Roberts,"7 ' view the confrontation clause as a guarantee against the
admission of unreliable hearsay evidence. In so holding, the Court very
nearly constitutionalizes the hearsay rule."' To understand fully the
Court's reasoning requires a thorough examination of the facts and
holdings of Dutton, Mancusi, and Roberts, focusing upon the factors
supplying the requisite "indicia of reliability."
The Court first articulated the "indicia of reliability" standard
in the plurality opinion of Dutton v. Evans.'74 Subject to incessant com-
mentary, the Dutton decision has slight precedential value1 7 5 since no
opinion of the Court commanded a majority. 7 ' Nevertheless, the cir-
cuits admitting unavailable witnesses' grand jury testimony heavily
rely upon this decision for support.1 77 Therefore, the Dutton opinion
merits considerable discussion.
The fact situation of Dutton is analogous to those instances in
which the circuits have admitted unavailable witnesses' grand jury
testimony in one critical respect. In both situations, the circumstances
169. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972);
and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
170. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
171. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
172. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
173. See Younger, supra note 2, at 41; see also Note, Right of Confrontation,
supra note 8, at 134.
174. In setting out the "indicia of reliability" test, the Court stated that the
presence of "indicia of reliability" is "determinative of whether a statement may be
placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant." Dutton, 400
U.S. at 89.
175. Younger, supra note 2, at 39.
176. Justice Stewart's plurality opinion was concurred in by Justices Blackmun
and White, and Chief Justice Burger; Justice Harlan concurred in the result. Dutton,
400 U.S. at 75. Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan concurred in Justice Marshall's
dissent. Id. at 100.
177. The circuits that admit unavailable witnesses' grand jury testimony all
cite the Dutton decision for support. See supra notes 53-56, 82, 95, and accompanying text.
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surrounding the admission of the hearsay evidence did not afford the
criminal defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay
declarant.' The defendant in Dutton and two co-conspirators were
charged with murder.'79 At the defendant's trial, the cell-mate of one.
co-conspirator was called to testiy."8 ° That witness described an occa-
sion when the co-conspirator stated to him that, "if it hadn't been
for that dirty son-of-a-bitch, Alex Evans [the defendant], we wouldn't
be in this now.''. The prosecutor did not call upon the co-conspirator
to testify, nor did he explain his reason for not doing so. Despite the
defendant's objection that his lack of opportunity to cross-examine
his co-conspirator violated his right to confrontation, the trial court
admitted the witness' inculpating hearsay statement. 82
Deciding that the declaration of the absent and previously un-
confronted co-conspirator bore sufficient "indicia of reliability," the
Court found that the admission of the hearsay evidence did not of-
fend the confrontation clause.'83 In so holding, the Court specifically
identified four indicators of reliability: first, because the co-
conspirator's statement "contained no express assertion of past fact,
. . . it carried on its face a warning to the jury against giving the
statement undue weight;"'' 4 second, the co-conspirator's persoral
knowledge of the crime charged against the defendant was clearly
established by other admissible evidence; 8 ' third, the circumstances
surrounding the co-conspirator's hearsay declaration -were such that
178. In each circuit decision that admits the grand jury testimony of an
unavailable witness, the criminal defendant was not afforded an opportunity to cross-
examine the grand jury witness. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
179. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 76.
180. Id. at 77.
181. Id.
182. The evidence was admitted under Georgia's version of the conspiratorial-
admission exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 77-78.
183. The opinion sets forth four considerations supporting the credibility of
the co-conspirator's out-of-court declaration and concludes that "there was no denial
of the right to confrontation." Id. at 88-89.
184. The Court reasoned that since the co-conspirator's hearsay declaration
did not contain an express assertion of the defendant's guilt, the jury was alerted
not to give the hearsay statement "undue weight." Id. at 88.
185. The testimony of the defendant's other co-conspirator implicated the hear-
say declarant and thereby established his personal knowledge of the identity and role
of those persons responsible for murder charged against the defendant. As such, the
Court concluded that it was "inconceivable" that cross-examination could have shown
that the hearsay declarant did not have personal knowledge of the event his hearsay
statement allegedly refers to. Id. at 88-89.
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there was only a remote possibility of faulty recollection;' fourth,
since the co-conspirator's statement was spontaneous and against his
penal interests, there was no apparent reason for him to lie.'87 Along
with these "indicia of reliability," the Court emphasized that the defen-
dant "vigorously and effectively" cross-examined the trial witness on
the question of whether the co-conspirator actually made the hearsay
declaration.'88 Implying that the reliability of the co-conspirator's hear-
say declaration was ensured by the defendant's confrontation of the
trial witness, the Court concluded that it was inconceivable that cross-
examination of the co-conspirator could prove the hearsay declaration
unreliable.'89 The Court subsequently admitted the hearsay evidence,
finding the defendant's lack of opportunity to cross-examine the co-
conspirator excused by the assurances of reliability provided by the
circumstances surrounding the hearsay testimony. 9 '
The reasoning employed by the Court in setting out the con-
siderations that provided the co-conspirator's hearsay declaration with
sufficient "indicia of reliability" is tenuous. The Court advances no
explanation in finding that the declarant's recollection could not have
been faulty. His declaration was made some eighteen months after
186. The Court does not explain why there was only a slight possibility of
faulty recollection. The specific language of the Court was: "Third, the possibility that
William's (the hearsay declarant) statement was founded on faulty recollection is remote
in the extreme." Id. at 89. See infra notes 191-194 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this consideration the Court identifies as an "indicia of reliability."
187. The specific language of the Court was:
... the circunstances under which Williams [the declarant] made the state-
ment were such as to give reason to suppose that Williams did not repre-
sent Evans' [the defendant] involvement in the crime. These circumstances
go beyond a showing that Williams had no apparent reason to lie to Shaw
[the witness]. His statement was spontaneous, and it was against his penal
interest to make it.
Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89.
188. Id. at 87.
189. The Court did not explain why the defendant's cross-examination of the
trial witness on the question of whether the co-conspirator actually made the hearsay
declaration rendered the hearsay statement reliable:
Evans [the defendant] exercised, and exercised effectively, his right to
confrontation on the factual question whether Shaw [the trial witness]
had actually heard Williams make the statement Shaw related. And the
possibility that cross-examination of Williams could conceivably have shown
the jury that the statement, though made, might have been unreliable
was wholly unreal.
Id. at 89. See also, Natali, supra note 6, at 51, where Professor Natali criticizes the
Court's determination that cross-examination of the trial witness made the declarant's
hearsay statement more reliable.
190. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-90.
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the event is allegedly refers to occurred.19 This suggests that there
was a possibility of faulty recollection. It also indicates that his state-
ment was not spontaneous." Moreover, the declaration, standing alone,
is much two ambiguous to amount to a declaration against interest.' 9a
Thus, it seems that the assurances of reliability surrounding the co-
conspirator's hearsay declaration are not as strong as the Court
believed them to be."M Nevertheless, the Court admitted the hearsay
evidence in apparent violation of the defendant's sixth amendment
right.
In admitting the co-conspirator's uncross-examined hearsay
declaration, the Court abandons the view that cross-examination is
the primary purpose of the confrontation clause.' The Dutton pluraltiy
regards the confrontation clause as a guarantee against the admis-
sion of evidence not bearing sufficient "indicia of reliability."'" It
equates confrontation with reliability. 97 The pupose of the hearsay
rule is also that of precluding the admission of unreliable evidence. 98
It too is a guarantee of reliability.' Thus, the Dutton plurality equates
the confrontation clause with the evidentiary hearsay rule.'O° Ironical-
191. Natali, supra note 6, at 52 n.57.
192. Under Georgia law, the Dutton hearsay declaration is not regarded as
spontaneous. Id.
193. Id. See also Dutton, 400 U.S. 103-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (declarant's
remark is so ambiguous that its meaning cannot be ascertained).
194. One commentator argues that the hearsay statement in Dutton is extremely
unreliable because it could easily be interpreted as a "tawdry attempt to shift blame."
Natalie, supra note 6, at 52 n.57.
195. The Dutton plurality expressly rejects the view that cross-examination
is the primary purpose of the confrontation clause:
The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the
Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy
of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that "the
trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement."
400 U.S. at 89 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 161). By deciding that hearsay evidence
bearing "indicia of reliability" provides a court with a "satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth" of prior statements, the Court equates confrontation with reliability. Thus,
the Dutton plurality views the confrontation clause as a guarantee of reliability, en-
suring against the admission of unreliable evidence.
196. See Younger, supra note 2, at 41; see also Note, Right of Confrontation,
supra note 8, at 134.
197. Younger, supra note 2, at 41.
198. See generally Yasser, supra note 11, at 587; Note, Catchall Hearsay, supra
note 11, at 1361.
199. See Younger, supra note 2, at 36. See also generally Yasser, supra note
11, at 587; Note, Catchall Hearsay, supra note 11, at 1361.
200. See e.q., Younger, supra note 2, at 41:
... reliability is what confrontation guarantees. We have seen that it
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ly, this is contrary to what the Court believed it was doing: "It seems
apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the
evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But this Court
has never equated the two, and we decline to do so now.""2 ' Never-
theless, by allowing the co-conspirator's uncross-examined hearsay
statement to be admitted into evidence, the Court implies that the
confrontation clause and evidentiary hearsay rule are co-extensive. '
This, in effect, very nearly constitutionalizes the hearsay rule.0 3
The Court's equation of the confrontation clause and hearsay rule
is the subject of considerable critical commentary.114 However, this
is by no means the only aspect of the Dutton decision that has been
criticized. Much has been made of the Court's lack of analysis on the
question of the co-conspirator's unavailability.,' Prior holdings of the
Court require the prosecution to make a good faith effort to secure
a witness' trial attendance before it will admit that witness' prior
recorded testimony.0 6 The Dutton plurality made no inquiry into
whether the Dutton prosecutor could have compelled the co-
conspirator's attendance at the defendant's trial. It did not require
that the prosecutor call the co-conspirator as a witness or explain his
reason for not doing so. In discussing the co-conspirator's absence,
the Court went no further than to remark that the defendant could
have subpoenaed the hearsay declarant. 7 The Dutton plurality thereby
suggests that the co-conspirator was not actually unavailable to testify
at the defendant's trial. As such, the Court's admission of the co-
conspirator's hearsay declaration is inconsistent with prior decisons
in which the Court refused to admit uncross-examined hearsay
testimony of declarants not shown to be actually unavailable. '
is also what the hearsay rule guarantees. If the receipt of reliable hear-
say does not offend the Confrontation Clause, then the right of confronta-
tion is nothing more than the hearsay rule. Things that are equal to the
same thing are themselves equal.
201. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 86.
202. Younger, supra note 2, at 41.
203. Note, Right of Confrontation, supra note 8, at 134.
204. See, e.g., Younger, supra note 2, at 39-42; Note, Right of Confrontation,
supra note 2, at 134. See generally Comment, Admission at Trial of Slain Informant's
Prior Grand Jury Testimony, supra note 8, 683.
205. See e.g., Baker, supra note 7, at 534; Younger, supra note 2, at 39; Note,
State Hearsay Exceptions for Co-conspirators Statement Held Not to Violate Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause, 49 N. CAR. L. REV. 788 (1971); The Supreme Court 1970 Term,
85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 188-99 (1971).
206. In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), the Court refused to admit a witness'
preliminary hearing testimony because the prosecution failed to make a good faith
effort to secure the witness' attendance at trial. See supra note 130.
207. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88 n.19.
208. Younger, supra note 2, at 39.
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Another aspect of the Dutton decision commonly viewed with
disfavor by commentators concerns the Court's attempts to reconcile
its admission of the uncross-examined hearsay testimony with its
holdings in Pointer, Douglas, and Bruton."°9 At the outset of the Dut-
ton plurality opinion, the Court emphasizes that unlike its prior
confrontation-hearsay decisions, the hearsay evidence at issue in Dut-
ton is neither "crucial" nor "devastating" to the defendant. 1 Noting
that no less than twenty witnesses appeared and testified against the
defendant, the Court stressed that the co-conspirator's hearsay declara-
tion was of "peripheral significance at most." ' The most logical and
obvious implication of these findings is that Dutton is distinguishable
from prior confrontation-hearsay decisions because the admission of
the uncross-examined hearsay evidence is harmless error.1 ' The Dut-
ton plurality, however, did not reach this conclusion. There remain
only two other plausible inferences that can be dawn from the Court's
comments on the content of the hearsay evidence: the admission of
the hearsay evidence was error, not harmless, but of an insufficient
magnitude to overturn the defendant's conviction;21 or, the admission
of the hearsay evidence was not error, the degree of protection af-
forded a criminal defendant under the confrontation clause lessens
as the adverse impact of an extra-judicial declaration decreases."4 The
former, a due process argument, 21' is inconsistent with the Court's
assertion that Dutton is decided under the confrontation clause." 6 The
latter is referred to as unsupportable and unworkable. 7 Neither ade-
209. See, e.g., Natali, supra note 6, at 50-52; Younger, supra note 2, at 39-40.
210. Having analyzed its holdings in Pointer, Douglas, and Bruton, the Dutton
plurality concluded that, "this case does not involve evidence in any sense 'crucial'
or 'devastating,' as did all the cases just discussed." Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87.
211. Id.
212. The emphasis the Court placed upon the content of the co-conspirators
hearsay statement indicates that the "harmless error test was transparently in con-
trol .. " Natali, supra note 6, at 51.
213. Younger, supra note 2, at 40.
214. This view of the Dutton holdings was discussed and ultimately rejected
by the Fourth Circuit in West, 574 F.2d at 1138. See also The Supreme Court, 1970
Terms, 85 HARv. L. REV. 3, 192, 196 (1971).
215. This view of the Court's holdings postulates that the admission of the
co-conspirator's hearsay declaration was error, but of an "insufficient magnitude to
warrant disturbing the conviction of so guilty a man." Younger, supra note 2, at 40.
As such, it constitutes a due process argument. Id.
216. Id.
217. The Fourth Circuit found no basis for applying this rule. The court held
that, "A flexible standard of more or less indicia of reliability triggered by supposi-
tions about the force of the impact of the particular evidence upon the jury could
hardly provide a workable standard." West, 574 F.2d at 1138.
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quately distinguishes Dutton from those confrontation-hearsay deci-
sions which view the confrontation clause as a guarantee of
cross-examination.
Disregarding the critical commentary that surrounds the Dutton
decision, a very strong argument can be made that the Dutton
plurality's view of the confrontation clause would permit the admis-
sion of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony.18 Under Dut-
ton, hearsay evidence is never rendered inadmissible merely because
no opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant is afforded a
criminal defendant.219 If hearsay evidence bears sufficient "indicia of
reliability," the Dutton plurality would allow that evidence to be ad-
mitted under the confrontaion clause.22 Thus, where an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony bears sufficient "indicia of reliability,"
the admission of that evidence would not offend the sixth amendment.
The question that remains unresolved is whether an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony could carry sufficient "indicia of reliabili-
ty" to permit its introduction into evidence. Admittedly, where grand
jury testimony is strongly corroborated by other admissible evidence,
such testimony would bear indicators of reliability equalling or, more
likely, exceeding those associated with the Dutton hearsay evidence."'
Thus, the Dutton opinion suggests that corroborated grand jury
testimony of an unavailable witness is admissible under the confron-
tation clause.222
The controversial nature of the Dutton decision, however, can-
not be ignored. As seen, the reasoning employed by the Dutton
218. See generally Comment, Admission at Trial of Slain Informant's Prior Grand
Jury Testimony, supra note 2, at 693.
219. The admission of the co-conspirator's uncross-examined hearsay declara-
tion demonstrates that the Dutton plurality does not view the confrontation clause
as a guarantee of cross-examination. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
220. This is precisely what the circuits have argued in admitting unavailable
witnesses' grand jury testimony. See supra notes 53-56, 82, 95, and accompanying text.
221. This is not to say that corroboration is an extremely effective means of
assuring the reliability of hearsay evidence. Rather, it reflects the tenuous nature
of the Court's reasoning in setting out the considerations that provided the Dutton
hearsay evidence with sufficient "indicia of reliability." See supra notes 183-94 and
accompanying text.
222. Admittedly, in most instances grand jury testimony would include express
assertions of past fact. Thus, the first of the four considerations that the Court sets
out as supplying sufficient "indicia of reliability" in Dutton would almost never be
present where grand jury testimony is introduced into evidence. See supra note 184
and accompanying text. Because the Court accorded no extraordinary significance to
this consideration as a means by which to assure reliability, its non-existence where
grand jury testimony is admitted into evidence is not of critical importance.
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plurality is suspect in several instances. 3 Moreover, as a mere plurali-
ty opinion, the decision is of limited precedential value."4 Therefore,
in order to determine whether an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony is admissible under the reliability approach, the Court's ap-
plication of the "indicia of reliability" test in subsequent decisions must
be carefully examined.
The Court next employed the "indicia of reliability" test in Man-
cusi v. Stubbs."'2 The hearsay evidence at issue in Mancusi consists
of an unavailable witness' former trial testimony.' The Mancusi defen-
dant was charged with murder and kidnapping.227 At the defendant's
first trial, one of the kidnap victims testified against the defendant.228
As a consequence of that witness' testimony, the defendant was
convicted.2 9 However, he was thereafter awarded a retrial.23 ° Having
moved out of the United States, the witness was not present to testify
at the defendant's second trial.2 1 The prosecutor therefore read into
evidence the transcript of the witness' former trial testimony." The
defendant objected, contending that the admission of the hearsay
evidence offended his sixth amendment right to confrontation.32
Citing Dutton, the Court decided that an unavailable witness'234
former trial testimony is admissible if that testimony bears sufficient
"indicia of reliability.""3 In determining whether the Mancusi witness'
former trial testimony carried with it sufficient "indicia of reliability,"
the Court did not discuss the considerations that furnished the re-
quisite indicators of reliability in Dutton. Neither did the Court con-
cern itself with the question of whether the testimony was cor-
223. See supra notes 191-217 and accompanying text.
224. Younger, supra note 2, at 39.
225. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
226. Id. at 209.
227. The defendant was charged with murder in the first degree and two counts
of kidnapping. Id. at 207.
228. Id. at 209.
229. Id. at 207.
230. The defendant was awarded a second trial on the ground that he had
been denied effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 209.
231. The witness had taken up permanent residence in Sweden. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. The court held the witness unavailable for purposes of the confrontation
clause, because the state was unable to compel the appearance of persons residing
in foreign countries. Id. at 212.
235. The court stated that in order for an unavailable witness' prior recorded
testimony to be admissible, that evidence "must bear some of these 'indicia of reliability'
referred to in Dutton." Id. at 213.
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roborated by other admissible evidence. Instead, the Court focused
its inquiry upon the adequacy of the defendant's opportunity to corss-
examine the witness at the initial trial.' Deciding that the defendant's
counsel had effectively cross-examined the witness at the first trial,237
the Court found that the defendant was provided with an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the witness and, therefore, the evidence
bore sufficient "indicia of reliability." '238 Accordingly, the Court held
that the admission of the former trial testimony did not violate the
confrontation clause.239
Like Pointer, Douglas, and Bruton, the admissibility of the hear-
say evidence in Mancusi turns upon the adequacy of the defendant's
opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant.240 However, while
Pointer, Douglas, and Bruton view the confrontation clause as a
guarantee of cross-examination, in Mancusi the Court regards the
clause as a guarantee of reliability."1 It views cross-examination as
merely a means by which to ensure reliability. u2 The Court does not
assert that an unavailable witness' former trial testimony carries suf-
ficient "indicia of reliability" only where the defendant is provided
236. The specific language of the Court was, "Before it can be said that Stubbs'
[the defendant] constitutional right to confront witnesses was not infringed, however,
the adequacy of Holm's [the unavailable witness] examination at the first trial must
be taken into consideration." Id. at 213. The Court identified no other considerations
as "indicia of reliability."
237. Id. at 214.
238. The Court specifically found that the adequacy of the defendant's oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witness at the frist trial satisfied the "indicia of reliability"
test:
Since there was an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Holm [the
unavailable witness] at the first trial, and counsel for Stubbs [the defen-
dant] availed himself of that opportunity, the transcript of Holm's testimony
in the first trial bore sufficient "indicia of reliability" and afforded " 'the
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truther of the prior
statement.' "
Id. at 216 (citing Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89).
239. Id.
240. In Pointer, Douglas, and Bruton, the Court found the admission of hear-
say evidence barred by the confrontation clause because the criminal defendant was
not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant. See supra notes
135, 146, 153, and accompanying text.
241. The Court will not admit hearsay evidence unless that evidence bears
"indicia of reliability." See supra note 235. This bars the admission of unreliable evidence
which in effect guarantees reliability. See also Note, The Right of Confrontation, supra
note 8, at 135.
242. The Court found the "indicia of reliability" test satisfied by the adequacy
of the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant. See supra notes
235-39 and accompanying text.
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with an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Never-
theless, the Court's failure to identify other "indicia of reliability,"
coupled with the importance the Court attaches to cross-examination
as a means by which to assure sufficient reliability, suggests that
uncross-examined prior recorded testimony of an unavailable witness
might not bear the requisite indicators of reliability.243 Thus, the Man-
cusi decision can be read as implying that an unavailable witness'
grand jury testimony is inadmissible. " The Court's holdings in Ohio
v. Roberts,245 its most recent confrontation-hearsay decision, also in-
dicate that grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness is inad-
missible for lack of sufficient "indicia of reliability."
The hearsay evidence at issue in Roberts consists of an
unavailable witness' preliminary hearing testimony. 6 The preliminary
hearing witness in question had been a defense witness whose
testimony was unfavorable to the defendant.247 The state was unable
to ascertain the whereabouts of the witness for testifying at the defen-
dant's trial.248 For this reason, the prosecutor introduced into evidence
the transcript of the witness' preliminary hearing testimony.49
Adopting the reliability approach utilized in Mancusi, the Court
decided that the admission of the unavailable25 ° witness' preliminary
hearing testimony would not violate the confrontation clause if that
evidence bore sufficient "indicia of reliability.""25 In determining
243. The Mancusi decision does not contain an exhaustive analysis of the
confrontation-hearsay issue. Thus, the contention that Mancusi would bar the admis-
sion of uncross-examined prior recorded testimony of unavailable witnesses is not
conclusive.
244. As seen, the circumstances surrounding the admission of an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony do not afford criminal defendants an opportunity to
cross-examine the grand jury witness. Thus, an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony qualifies as uncross-examined hearsay evidence.
245. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
246. Id. at 59.
247. The Roberts defendant was charged with forging checks. At the defen-
dant's preliminary hearing, the defense counsel called and examined the witness in
question, attempting to elicit from her an admission that she had given the defendant
permission to use the checks he subsequently forged. Id. at 58.
248. Id. at 60.
249. Id. at 59.
250. The Court concluded that the prosecutor established the unavailability
of the witness through what the Court determined to be a good faith effort to locate
the declarant prior to trial. Id. at 74-77.
251. The specific language of the Court, was, "In sum, when a hearsay declarant
is not present for cross-examination at trial .... his statement is admissible only if
it bears adequate indicia of reliability." Id. at 66.
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whether the witness' hearsay declaration carried sdufficient assurances
of reliability, the Court did not concern itself with the considerations
that supplied the requisite "indicia of reliability" in Dutton. Like Man-
eusi, the Court only considered the adequacy of the defendant's op-
portunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant as the means by
which to satisfy the "indicia of reliability" requirement.252 The Roberts
decision discusses no other factors indicating that the preliminary hear-
ing testimony was reliable.
To determine whether the Roberts defendant was provided with
an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant, the
Court carefully analyzed the defendant's direct examination of the
witness at the preliminary hearing.2 53 Noting that the defendant's at-
torney asked numerous leading questions,2" the Court found that as
a matter of form, the defense counsel's direct examination of the
witness was the equivalent of cross-examination. 5 The Court next
examined the substantive nature of the questions the defendant's at-
torney asked the witness.25 It concluded that:
... counsel's questioning comported with the principal pur-
pose of cross-examination: to challenge "whether the
declarant was sincerely telling what he believed to be the
truth, whether the declarant accurately perceived and
remembered the matter he related, and whether the
declarant's intended meaning is adequately conveyed by the
language he employed.5 '
Hence, the Court decided that the defendant's direct examina-
tion of the witness at the preliminary hearing provided the defen-
dant with an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable
hearsay declarant.5 5 Accordingly, the Court found that the testimony
252. To satisfy the "indicia of reliability" test, the Court focused its inquiry
upon whether the defendant's direct examination of the witness was the equivalent
to cross-examination at trial. Id. at 67-72.
253. Id. at 70-71.
254. The Court found that the defendant's attorney asked the witness "seven-
teen plainly leading questions." Id. at 70 n.11.
255. The Court held that, "counsel's questioning clearly partook of cross-
examination as a matter of form. His presentation was replete with leading questions,
the principal tool and hallmark of cross-examination." Id. at 70-71.
256. Id. at 71.
257. Id. (quoting, Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator
Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1378 (1972).
258. The specific language of the Court was ". . . defense counsel in this case
tested Anita's [the unavailable witness] testimony with the equivalent of significant
cross-examination." Id. at 70.
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bore sufficient "indicia of reliability" and was admissible under the
confrontation clause.5 9
The reasoning employed by the Court in equating direct examina-
tion at a preliminary hearing with cross-examination at trial is tenuous.
The nature and objective of a preliminary hearing and a trial differ
considerably.' 8 In a preliminary hearing, the ultimate issue is whether
there exists probable cause to believe a crime has been committed
and that the defendant committed it. 6' At trial, the ultimate issue
is whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.2
Accordingly, a defense attorney's objectives in examining witnesses
at a preliminary hearing differ significantly from that when question-
ing witnesses at trial. Consequently, at a preliminary hearing, the ques-
tioning of witnesses is much less thorough than their examination at
trial.63
In Roberts, the Court briefly considered this argument, ultimately
rejecting it.2" The Court nevertheless acknowledged that some dif-
259. Id. at 73.
260. In his dissenting opinion in Green, 399 U.S. at 195, Justice Brennan argued
that because the nature and objectives of the two proceedings differ significantly, con-
frontation at a preliminary hearing cannot compensate for the absence of confronta-
tion at trial. See also Note, Right of Confrontation, supra note 8, at 136-37.
261. Green, 399 U.S. at 197 (Brennan dissenting).
262. Id.
263. Justice Brennan noted several reasons why examination at preliminary
hearings "pales beside that which takes place at trial." Each related to the nature
of preliminary hearings as compared to trials:
First, as noted, the objective of the hearing is to establish the presence
or absence of probable cause, not guilt or innocence proved beyond a
reasonable doubt; thus, if evidence suffices to establish probable cause,
defense counsel has little reason at the preliminary hearing to show that
it does not conclusively establish guilt-or, at least, he had little reason
before today's decision. Second, neither defense nor prosecution is eager
before trial to disclose its case by extensive examination at the preliminary
hearing; thorough questioning of a prosecution witness by defense counsel
may easily amount to a grant of gratis discovery to the State. Third, the
schedules of neither court nor counsel can easily accommodate lengthy
preliminary hearings. Fourth, even were the judge and lawyers not con-
cerned that the proceedings be brief, the defense and prosecution have
generally had inadequate time before the hearing to prepare for exten-
sive examination. Finally, though counsel were to engage in extensive
questioning, a part of its force would never reach the trial factfinder,
who would know the examination only second hand.
Id.
264. Citing the majority opinion of Green, the Court refused to "disassociate
preliminary hearing testimony previously subjected to cross-examination ... from cross-
examined trial testimony." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72-73 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 165).
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ferences exist between the examination of witnesses at a preliminary
hearing and that at trial. 5 Hence, the Court had good reason to bolster
its opinion by identifying any additional considerations which indicated
that the preliminary hearing testimony was reliable. Its failure to do
so suggests that the circumstances surrounding the admission of an
unavailable witness' preliminary hearing testimony do not provide
alternative considerations which satisfy the "indicia of reliability"
requirement.
Unlike preliminary hearing testimony, the circumstances
surrounding the admission of an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony never afford a criminal defendant an adequate opportunity
to cross-examine the hearsay declarant. 6" Thus, alternative means of
satisfying the "indicia of reliability" requirement must be found for
grand jury testimony to be admissible under the confrontation clause.
The circumstances surrounding grand jury hearings are virtually iden-
tical to those associated with preliminary hearings. The only signifi-
cant difference between the two proceedings is that preliminary hear-
ings afford the accused an opportunity to call his own witnesses and
cross-examine those who testify against him. 6 ' Since Roberts indicates
that the circumstances surrounding the admission of an unavailable
witness' preliminary hearing testimony do not furnish alternative con-
siderations which satisfy the "indicia or reliability" requirement, it
is only logical to assume that neither would the circumstances sur-
rounding an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony. Thus, the
Roberts decision suggests that an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony is inadmissible for lack of sufficient "indicia of reliability."
The circuits that have found unavailable witnesses' grand jury
testimony admissible under the "indicia of reliability" approach266
misinterpret Dutton, Mancusi, and Roberts. Each circuit that admits
grand jury testimony of unavailable witnesses cites the Dutton
plurality opinion for suport.6 9 Their reliance upon this decision is mis-
265. The Court acknowledged that testimony elicited at preliminary hearings
merely approximates that which is elicited at trial. Id. at 69 (citing Green, 399 U.S.
at 165).
266. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
268. All three federal circuit courts of appeals that admit grand jury testimony
of unavailable witnesses have done so under the Supreme Court's "indicia of reliability"
test. See supra notes 51-52, 82, 89, and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 51-52, 82, 95 and accompanying text. See also Comment,
Admission at Trial of Slain Informant's Prior Grand Jury Testimony, supra note 2,
at 693, where the author concludes that the Fourth Circuit admits unavailable witness'
grand jury testimony based upon the Dutton holding.
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placed. Having failed to resolve the question of the hearsay declarant's
unavailability,"' the Dutton opinion represents an anomaly in this line
of the Court's confrontation-hearsay decisions." The holdings of the
Dutton plurality ultimately rest upon the Court's determination that
the hearsay evidence at issue was of "peripheral significance.""2 2 Each
time the circuits have admitted an unavailable witness' grand jury
testimony, that evidence was an important consideration in convic-
ting the defendant.27 The Dutton decision is, therefore, distinguishable
from those instances when the circuits have admitted grand jury
testimony. Accordingly, it does not support the proposition that an
unavailable witness' grand jury testimony is admissible under the
Court's "indicia of reliability" test. The same can be said about the
Mancusi and Roberts decisions.
Neither Mancusi nor Roberts postulate that all hearsay evidence
is inadmissible for lack of sufficient "indicia of reliability" absent an
adequate opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the hearsay
declarant. However, by emphasizing cross-examination as a means by
which to assure adequate reliability, and by failing to identify other
"indicia of reliability," both decisions suggest that nothing other than
cross-examination, or equivalent physical confrontation, can provide
prior recorded testimony with the requisite assurances of reliability.
Because the circumstances surrounding the elicitation and admission
of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony do not afford a
criminal defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay
declarant, or equivalent physical confrontation, that evidence is inad-
missible for lack of sufficient "indicia of reliability."
In deciding that corroborated grand jury testimony of unavailable
witnesses bears sufficient "indicia of reliability,"' 4 the Fourth, Seventh,
and Sixth Circuits reduce the confrontation clause to the status of
270. The Dutton plurality implies that the declarant of the hearsay testimony
at issue was available to testify at the defendant's trial. As such, stare decisis re-
quires a holding that the defendant's lack of opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay
declarant violates the confrontation clause. E.g., Younger, supra note 2, at 39. The
Dutton plurality did not resolve this issue. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
271. Comment, The Confrontation Clause and the Catchall Exception, supra note
12, at 707-08.
272. Id. See generally Natali, supra note 6, at 50-51.
273. See Comment, Admission at Trial of Slain Informant's Prior Grand Jury
Testimony, supra note 2, at 693, where the author notes that the West grand jury
testimony was a critical consideration in determining the defendant's guilt.
274. Each circuit that admits unavailable witness' grand jury testimony relies
upon corroborative evidence to supply the necessary "indicia of reliability." See supra
notes 57-58, 85, 96, and accompanying text.
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the evidentiary hearsay rule."5 These courts imply that evidence
reliable enough to be admissible under the hearsay rule is reliable
enough to be admissible under the confrontation clause. This is not
always the case." ' An unavailable witness' prior recorded testimony
may be reliable enough to be admissible under the hearsay rule ab-
sent an opportunity for the criminal defendant to cross-examine the
hearsay declarant.277 However, the Mancusi and Roberts decisions in-
dicate that an unavailable witness' prior recorded testimony does not
carry adequate assurances of reliability to be admissible under the
confrontation clause unless the criminal defendant is afforded an op-
portuity to cross-examine the witness."' The Fourth, Seventh, and
Sixth Circuits ignore the emphasis the Supreme Court places upon
physical confrontation as a means of assuring sufficient reliability. In
so doing, they misapply the Court's "indicia of reliability" test. An
unavailable witness' grand jury testimony does not bear sufficient "in-
dicia of reliability" because the circumstances surrounding that hear-
say testimony do not afford a criminal defendant an opportunity to
cross-examine the hearsay declarant.
Thus, whether viewed as a guarantee against the admission or
evidence not bearing sufficient "indicia of reliability," or as a guarantee
of cross-examination, the confrontation clause bars the admission of
an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony. Neither of the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the confrontation clause dispense with cross-
examination as a required element of confrontation when hearsay
evidence consists of unavailable witness' prior recorded testimony.
Both interpretations emphasize that substantial compliance with the
purposes behind the confrontation requirement cannot be attained
when hearsay evidence is an unavailable witness' prior recorded
testimony, unless the criminal defendant is afforded an adequate op-
portunity to physically confront the hearsay declarant. The cir-
cumstances surrounding an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony
never afford criminal defendants an opportunity to cross-examine the
hearsay declarant. Accordingly, under both of the Court's views of
the confrontation clause, the admission of an unavailable witness' grand
275. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
276. The Supreme Court has "more than once found a violation of confronta-
tion values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably
recognized hearsay exception." Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56 (citing Barber, 390 U.S. at
719; Pointer, 380 U.S. at 400).
277. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Evidence-
Hearsay, supra note 62, at 416.
278. See supra notes 240-244, 260-266, and accompanying text.
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jury testimony is an impermissible violation of a criminal defendant's
confrontation rights.
Only one of four circuits that have decided the admissibility of
an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony is cognizant of the em-
phasis the Supreme Court places upon cross-examination as a protec-
tor of confrontation values. 9 Refusing to reduce the confrontation
clause to a mere consideration of evidentiary value, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found the hearsay evidence inadmissible under the confrontation
clause because the criminal defendant was not provided with an op-
portunity to cross-examine the witness. Supreme Court precedent
proves this to be the proper resolution of the admissibility of an
unavailable witness' grand jury testimony.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to set out a coherent theory of the
relationship between the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule.
One line of the Supreme Court's confrontation-hearsay decisions views
the confrontation clause as a guarantee that assures criminal defen-
dants the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying against
them. A second line of the Court's confrontation-hearsay decisions in-
dicates that the confrontation clause is a guarantee against the ad-
mission of unreliable evidence. Despite their difference in focus, both
views emphasize cross-examination as the ultimate protector of con-
frontation values. Neither view dispenses with cross-examination as
a required element of confrontation when hearsay evidence is prior
recorded testimony. Hence, to resolve the admissibility of an
unavailable witness' grand jury testimony it is unnecessary to decide
which of the Court's theories of confrontation is "correct." The cir-
cumstances surrounding the elicitation and admission of an unavailable
witness' grand jury testimony do not afford criminal defendants an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness testifying against them.
Thus, whether viewed as a guarantee of cross-examination, or as a
guarantee of reliability, the confrontation clause bars the admission
of an unavailable witness' grand jury testimony.
JOHN W. WEIHMULLER
279. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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